By Graham Priest
Dialetheism is the view that a few contradictions are real. This has implications for lots of of the middle notions of philosophy.
Graham Priest explores those implications for fact, rationality, negation and the character of good judgment, and develops additional the defence of dialetheism present in his previous paintings, In Contradiction.
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About the Author
Shaun Gallagher is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences, and Senior Researcher on the Institute of Simulation and coaching, on the college of principal Florida (USA); he has secondary learn appointments on the collage of Hertfordshire and the college of Copenhagen. He has been vacationing Scientist on the Cognition and mind Sciences Unit, Cambridge, and traveling Professor on the college of Copenhagen, the Centre de Recherche en Epistemelogie Appliquee (CREA), Paris, and the Ecole Normale Superiure, Lyon.
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Additional resources for Doubt Truth to Be a Liar
Aristotle envisages an objector who says something like this—I change ‘two-footed animal’ to ‘rational animal’ to make things a bit punchier: ‘Look, Aristotle, it’s quite clear that contradictions can be true. Just consider Hipparchia; she both is and isn’t a man. So it’s not necessarily true that if anything is a man it is a rational animal. Hipparchia is a woman, so she’s not rational. You are probably going to say that “man” and “not man” have two different meanings here, so the objection doesn’t count.
Of Kripke’s kind, that objects have a single necessary property. 9 FIR S T RE F UTATI O N : PA RT I I ( 7a 20–b 18 ) With these preliminary comments out of the way, let us return to the text. This continues (7a 20) as follows: Those who say this entirely eliminate substance and what it is to be. For it is necessary for them to maintain that all things are coincidences and that there is no such thing as what to be a man or to be an animal [is]. g. Dancy (1975), ch. 5. ÌÉ Though, conceivably, one might want to single out those that are connected with criteria of identity, or something similar, as special.
In the next paragraph Aristotle goes on to give an argument for the existence of his substances. The argument is to the effect that if there are any properties, even accidental ones, there must be substances for these to be properties of. One might take issue with some of Aristotle’s arguments for this. One might even bite the bullet and accept an ontology of properties but no bearers. However, someone who does this is certainly ﬂying in the face of common sense. So let us grant that this follows, and that it is unacceptable.