By A. Voltolini
What's depiction? a brand new solution is given to this venerable query by means of delivering a syncretistic conception of depiction that attempts to mix the benefits of the former theories at the subject whereas shedding their defects. hence, not just perceptual, but additionally either traditional and causal elements give a contribution in making anything an image of whatever else.
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Additional resources for A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction
Yet by just looking at the mirror itself one cannot grasp whether it depicts the Earth element or its Twin-Earth counterpart; one has to know where the mirror is located. All in all, therefore, modulo the above amendment, the Goodmanian semiotician couples pictorial and non-pictorial representations as regards their intentionality. However, by so doing he or she does not wish to deny that there is a difference between such kinds of representations. This difference has to be located at the level of the figurativity of the picture, of what makes a pictorial representation pictorial.
Thus, this grasping of grouping properties precisely shows why the recognitional fold cannot float free of the configurational fold, by implausibly allowing the seeing-in entertainer to see in the picture whatever he or she likes or imagines. Instead, as I just hinted at, the content of the recognitional fold is to be bound by the content of the configurational fold; more precisely, what is recognized in the recognitional fold depends on which grouping properties of the vehicle are grasped in the configurational fold.
Of all the compatible representational contents, the content that picture has as its real pictorial content depends on the negotiation that governs such a selection. Now, the particular account the syncretist provides of the picture’s figurativity determines how, for the syncretist, the figurative content of a picture exercises its constraining role on the picture’s representational powers. As we will briefly see below, such an account allows the syncretist to combine the best elements he or she finds from the various perceptualist approaches.